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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BARBARA SMITH,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No. 14,410

vs.
LYMAN S. SHREEVE,
Defendant and Respondent.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE

This is an action for personal injuries and damages resulting from an automobile collision at an intersection in Provo,
Utah.

Appellant claims that the defendant was negligent in the

operation of his car and that his negligence caused the accident.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The issue of defendant's negligence was tried to an eight
member jury on November 17 and 18, 1975.

The jury returned a

verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant,
awarding plaintiff $2,000.00 in general damages and nothing in
special damages.

Plaintiff subsequently made a motion for a new

trial on the ground that the jury av/arded inadequate damages appearing to have been given under the influence of passion and
prejudice and that the Court erred in law for failing to give
certain requested jury instructions.

The Court denied plaintiff's

motion for a new trial and the plaintiff appeals the denial of
the motion.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks to have the Court declare that the award
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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was inadequate as a matter of law and to have the case remanded
to the lower court for a new trial.
{

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On December 5, 1971, an accident occurred at the intersection of 3230 North and 650 East in Provo, Utah.

(Tr. 13, P. Ex.

1, 2, 3, 6) The plaintiff, Barbara Smith, who, at that time was
unmarried and was known as Barbara Mortenson, was driving with
a passenger, Pauline Smith, in an easterly direction on 3230
North.

The defendant, Lyman Shreeve, and his wife were proceed-

ing south on 650 East.

(Tr. 167)

Plaintiff was driving a Ford

Falcon station wagon and defendant was driving a Chrysler New
Yorker.

The weather was clear but the roads were icy and snow-

packed due to a recent snowfall.

However, the easterly lane on

650 East was more heavily traveled and was fairly clear of snow.
i

(Tr. 37,167, P. Ex. 1, 2, 3) The appellant entered the intersection with the intention of turning north on 650 East. As the
appellant entered the intersection and began her turn, she saw
i

the defendant's vehicle approaching her from the north.

(Tr. 122)

The vehicles collided, the point of impact being somewhere between 19 and.30 feet north of what would be the imaginary exten<

sion of the north line of the intersection and 2 0 feet east of
the curb, so that the impact occurred in the northbound or east
lane of traffic on 650 East. (Tr. 16, 18, 21-22, 30-31, 42, 45;
P. Ex. 1, 2, 3, 4; D. Ex. 11, 12)

The plaintiff's vehicle was

struck just about at the door jamb and the impact knocked the
left-hand door off and knocked the vehicle backwards so the vehicle was resting in a ditch on the eastern edge of the road.
(2P- Ex. 3)

The Shreeve vehicle swung around and was sitting alDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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most crossways in the road.

(P. Ex. 1, 2, 3)

The plaintiff re-

ceived cuts on the side of her face and a cut on her chin.

She

also suffered a severe permanent injury to her left knee.
Barbara Smith subsequently filed this action, claiming that
the defendant was negligent in the operation of his vehicle;
claiming general damages in the amount of $50,000.00, special
damages in the amount of $1,731.00 and additional special damages incurred to the close of trial.
The case was tried to a jury on November 17 and 18, 1975.
While the jury was deliberating the case, they sent a hand-written note to the trial judge which stated substantially as follows:
We find that both parties were contributorily negligent but may we award punitive damages
to the plaintiff?
The note was discussed in chambers with counsel after which
the Court wrote on the bottom of the note as follows:
No.

See Instructions Nos. 4 and 5.

The note was then returned to the jury by the ballif and
thereafter the jury returned its verdict.

The handwritten note

was never returned by the jury and was either lost or destroyed
and no transcript was made of it.

(R. 4 and 4a)

Thereafter,

the jury returned the following verdict:
We the jury impaneled in the above-entitled cause find the issues in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant and assess
the damages of the plaintiff as follows:
General Damages:
$2,000.00
Special Damages:
$
(Record 31)
Immediately after rendering their verdict, the judge dismissed the jury and the jury left the courtroom.

(Tr. 254) The Court

then asked counsel if they had anything further.

Counsel for
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plaintiff questioned the validity of a verdict in which there
were general damages but no special damages awarded,

(Tr. 2 55)

After some discussion, the Court concluded the case and recessed.

(Tr. 255)

Shortly thereafter, counsel for plaintiff filed

a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, alleging that there were inadequate damages
appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or
prejudice and that the Court erred ir law for failing to give requested jury instructions.

(R. 22)

Thereafter, the trial court

denied plaintiff's motion for a new trial or for an additur.
19)

(R.

From the denial of the motion for a new trial, this plaintiff

appeals.
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT APPELLANT1S MOTION
FOR A NEW TRIAL. Appellant made a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule
59(a) (5) and (7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule

59(a)(5),(7) states as follows:
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of
Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to all or
any of the parties and on all or part of the
issues, for any of the following causes:. . .
* * *

(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the influence
of passion or prejudice...
* * *

(7)

Error in law.

Appellant submits it is clear that the jury verdict in the
present case was given under the influence of prejudice or misunderstanding.

The facts surrounding the rendering of the ver-

dict and the inadequacy of the verdict show a disregard by the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated
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jury of the evidence and
of theOCR,
instructions
of the Court as to

the law applicable to the case and, consequently, the verdict was
rendered under disregard or misapprehension of the evidence or influence of passion or prejudice.

It is certainly clear from the

evidence in the case and the verdict that the jury did not know
what it was doing in awarding damages and simply failed to do
its duty.
It has generally been held that where a jury's verdict was
rendered under misunderstanding or prejudice, a new trial should
be granted under Rule 59(a)(5)%
Rule 59(a)(5), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that a new trial may be granted
on grounds of excessive or inadequate damages,
appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice. It is not enough,
.under this rule nor under the code provision
which it supplanted, merely to allege that the
amount itself is excessive. The amount of the
- v e r d i c t is ordinarily a matter exclusively for
the jury and on the ground of adequacy of the
verdict alone, the court may not interfere with
the jury's verdict unless it clearly appears that
the award was rendered under misunderstanding or
prejudice. If inadequacy or excessiveness of
the verdict presents a situation that such inadequacy or excessiveness shows a disregard by the
jury of the evidence or the instructions of the
court as to the law applicable to the case as to
satisfy the court that the verdict was rendered
under such disregard or misapprehension of the
evidence or influence of passion or prejudice,
then the court may exercise its discretion in the
interest of justice and grant a new trial. Saltas v. Affleet, 99 Utah 381, 105 P.2d 176; Walkenhorst v. Kesler, 92 Utah 312, 67 P.2d 654;
Miller v. Southern Pacific Co., 82 Utah 46, 21
P.2d 865. Therefore, in reviewing the trial
court's ruling denying defendant's motion for
new trial on grounds of excessiveness of damages
awarded by the jury's verdict, this court is
limited to a determination of whether such a ruling was an abuse of discretion. The Supreme
Court is slow to interfere with a trial court's
ruling granting or refusing a new trial on
questions relating to damages. Hirabelli v.
Daniels, 44 Utah 88, 138 P. 1172; Chatelain v.
Thackeray, 98 Utah 5 25, 100 P.2d 191. The question here on appeal, then, is a determination of
. «*
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,

whether the damages awarded bear no proper relation to the wrong suffered as shown by the evidence and in accordance with the instructions of
the court so that this court may exercise its
power to set aside the verdict of the jury,
(emphasis added) Paul v. Kirkendall, 1 Utah 2d
1, 261 P.2d 670, 671 (1553).
—
See also Stamp v. Union Pacific R.R. Co,, 5 Utah 2d 397,
303 P.2d 279 (1956); Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 366 P.2d
701 (1961).

It is obvious that the proper remedy under Rule

59(a)(5) when the verdict is based upon misunderstanding or prejudice is to remand the case for a new trial.

See Stamp v. Union

Pacific R.R. Co., supra.
Appellant proved special damages at trial in the amount of
$1,737.75 and loss of wages in the sum of $4,916.40.
Tr. 136-137)

(P. Ex. 17,

The failure of the jury to award the appellant any-

thing for her special damages shows that the jury clearly misunderstood its duty.

Although the evidence of special damages

was entered at the trial, the jury disregarded the proof of
special damages in arriving at its verdict.

Anytime a plaintiff

proves his damages, he is entitled to be compensated for the damages shown.
As to the amount of damages, the evidence
was conflicting and if some damages, though
only nominal, had been awarded plaintiff by
the trial court, it would not be within our
power to interfere. However, as some damage
was unquestionably shown, the court's finding
on that issue had no evidence whatever to support it and was against all the evidence.
Stringfellow v. Bottorill Auto Co., 63 Utah
56 , 221 P. 861 (1923).
The amount of damages is largely within
the jury's discretion. However, they must
award something for every element of damage
resulting from an injury. Missouri Pacific
Railroad Company v. Dean, 117 S.W.2d 357 (1967).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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It is logical to conclude that the jury's
award resulted from the jurors1 misapprehending
their duty or compromising the question of plaintiff-driverfs liability. Whatever impelled the
return of the verdict of $8000, the award is for
less than the plaintiff's undisputed special damages and obviously is not commensurate with his
injury and bears no reasonable relationship to
his loss. It is apparent the damages awarded
were inadequate under all of the prevailing tests
for adequacy, and therefore, the trial court erred in overruling plaintiffs1 motion for a new
trial. Such error necessitates reversal. Householder v. Town of Clayton, 221-N.W.2d 488 (Iowa
1974)
The failure of the jury to award plaintiff any amount for
special damages proved indicates that the verdict was rendered .
under prejudice or misunderstanding and appellant is entitled to
a new trial.
Appellant is aware of the cases holding that any irregularity in a verdict is v/aived by not asking that it be corrected before the jury is discharged. Gohen v. J. C. Penney Co., Inc., 37
P.2d 306 (Utah 1975); Langton v. International Transport, Inc.,
26 Utah 2d 452, 491 P.2d 1121 (1971); Lish v. Utah Power & Light
Co., 27 Utah 2d 90, 493 P.2d 611 (1972).

Appellant submits, how-

ever, that the rule enunciated in those cases is inapplicable in
the present case.
The rule of waiver for failure to object does not apply in
a case where the motion is made pursuant to Rule 59(a) (5).

This

distinction was explained in Langton v. International Transport,
Inc., supra, at 1215, as follows:
In the instant case, plaintiff may not
properly invoke Rule 59(a) (5), U.R.C.P., as
a ground for a new trial. There is a basic
distinction between an insufficient or informal verdict and a verdict regular on its face,
which awards inadequate damages, appearing to
have been given under .the influence of passion
or prejudice. Rule 59 (a*) (5). In the latter
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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case, a new trial must be granted to correct
the error. In the former case, counsel has
an opportunity to assert an objection, and the
court, under Rule 47(r) , U.R.C.P., may return
the jury for further deliberation and with further instruction to correct the irregularity.
If cousel does not avail himself of this opportunity, his objection to the irregularity
of the verdict is waived', (emphasis added)
That a new trial must be granted to correct error under Rule
59(a)(5) is logical since the basis for the motion under Rule
59(a)(5) is that the verdict was the result of the influence of
passion or prejudice.

It woul$ be meaningless to require the

jury to return for further jury deliberation under Rule 47 (r)
if the jury had rendered its verdict because of passion or prejudice.

There is no reason to believe that the jury would become

less passionate or less prejudiced by merely returning and deliberating further.
Additionally, appellant asserts that even if the rule of
waiver for failure to object did apply to Rule- 59(a)(5), that the
failure to object would not bar granting of a new trial in the
present case because the plaintiff had no opportunity to object
to the verdict before the jury was dismissed.

The following con-

versation took place at the time the verdict was read:
THE COURT: It will be the order of the
court that the judgment be entered pursuant
to the verdict of the jury.
Thank you for your services. You will be
notified when to come again. It won't be
9:30 in the morning I understand.
(Discussion off the record.)
(Whereupon, the jury left the courtroom.)
.

THE COURT:

Do you gentlemen have anything?

MR. WEST: The only question I have, Your
Honor, is the question that came out and went
back to the jury. Is that part of the record?
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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THE COURT:

I don't know whether it is or

not.
THE BALLIF: The jury didnft return it to
me when I picked up the pad. The jury still
has it as far as I know. It wasnft on the pad
when I picked up the pad, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

We know what it was anyway.

MR. WEST: Well, all right. I am wondering if some record ought to be made of what
that question was and the answer that went back.
THE COURT: Without having the written record I can't be sure that I would state it correctly — without having the written statement.
MR. LEWIS: Did I understand the verdict correctly to read that was general and no special?
THE COURT:

No specials.

MR. LEWIS:

Two thousand dollars? .

THE COURT: If it were all specials and
no generals there would be an objection over
here. If it were all specials and no generals
you would object because they can't give a
special verdict without•* a general, can they?
Very well.
MR. WEST:

Well —

MR. LEWIS: I haven't seen a general without a special either.
THE COURT: That would conclude the case
as far as we are concerned tonight. The court
will be in recess.
(The court was ordered in recess.)
—00O00--

(Tr. 254-255)
As can be seen by the above dialogue, counsel for the plaintiff had no opportunity to object to the verdict before the jury
had been dismissed by the Court.

The Court asked counsel if they

had anything further only after the jury had been dismissed.
Further, the above dialogue shows that counsel for plaintiff had
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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an opportunity to carefully examine the verdict only after the
jury had left the courtroom*

Under such circumstances, it would

have been entirely improper for the Court to recall the jury to
the courtroom and then reinstruct them and send them back to the
courtroom.

Consequently, appellant's only alternative was to ask

for a new trial or for an additur adding the amount of special
damage proved.
It is appellant's position that under Rule 59(a)(5) appellant
is entitled to an order, remanding the case to the lower court for
a new trial.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE APPELLANT'S REQUESTED JURY
INSTRUCTION NO. 2.
Appellant f s requested instruction no. 2 read as follows:
You are instructed that the defendant
was negligent as a matter of law.
It is appellant's position that the respondent was negligent
as a matter of law for failure to yield the right-of-way at an
intersection and for driving in the wrong lane within 100 feet
of an intersection, and that the Court erred in refusing to give
appellant's requested instruction no. 2,

In the alternative, the

appellant asserts that respondent was negligent as a matter of law
for driving in the wrong lane and the question of respondent's
negligence was not a question of fact for the jury and, therefore, the Court erred in failing to give instruction no. 2.
Utah Code Annotated, §41-6-72 (a) governs right of way at
uncontrolled intersections.

That section states as follows:

The driver of a vehicle approaching an
intersection shall yield the right of way to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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t

a vehicle which has entered the intersection
from a different highway*
Utah Code Annotated, §41-6-58 prohibits the driving on the
left side of a roadway within a hundred feet of an intersection.
That section states as follows:
(a) No vehicle shall at any time be
driven to the left side of the roadway under
the following conditions:
•

• •

(2) when approaching within one hundred
feet of or traversing any intersection, railroad grade crossing.
• •••'•••

In the present case it is clear that the defendant violated
both of the above-cited statutes.

The defendant failed to yield

the right-of-way to the plaintiff as he approached the intersection (Tr. 169, 181, 183) and, in addition, the defendant, as
shown by the point of impact (Tr. 18, 42, 45; P. Ex. 6), was driving in the lefthand lane within one hundred feet of an intersection,
Appellant submits that such violation of the statutes constitutes
negligence as a matter of law and the Court erred in failing to so
instruct the jury.
The Utah court has held in several cases that the violation
of a standard of safety set by statute can, under certain circuits
stances, constitute negligence as a matter of law.

In Thompson

v. Ford Motor Co., 16 Utah 2d 30, 395 P.2d 62 (1964), this Court
discussed at length the cases concerning violation of statutes
and whether the violation constituted negligence per se or negligence as a matter of law.

The Court stated as follows:

We are aware that it has sometimes been
•.- stated as a general rule that violation of a
statutory standard of care is negligence as a
matter of law. This is indeed a sound rule,
but like all generalities, it has its limitaDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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tions and is applicable only under proper circumstances. The court has previously had occasion to consider this problem and to point
out the distinction between applying this rule
where the circumstances justify it and where
they do not.
Although the court in Thompson held that the defendant v/as
not negligent as a matter of law, it did so because it said that
the defendant's conduct could reasonably be regarded as within
the standard of care contemplated by the statute.

However, in

the present case, it is clear that the defendant was not within
the standard of care contemplated by the statute.

Had the de-

fendant been driving entirely within his own lane as required by
statute, it is evident that the accident would not have happened.
In addition, had the defendant yielded the right-of-way to the
plaintiff as required by the statute, then the plaintiff would
have successfully made the turn and the accident would have been
avoided.
It is clear that the defendant's violation of the statutes
constituted negligence as a matter of law and, therefore, the
Court committed prejudicial error in failing to so instruct the
jury.
CONCLUSION
Since the total special damages proved far exceeded the
amount of the general damage award, it is clear that the verdict
was a result of prejudice or misunderstanding on the part of the
jury and that the Court erred in failing to grant appellant's motion for a new trial.

Appellant also submits that the facts viewed

most favorably to the defendant show

that he violated the stat-

utes and standard of care required of him and that he was negliDigitized of
by the law.
Howard W. Hunter
Law Library, J. Reuben Clark
Law trial
School, BYU.court erred in
gent as a matter
Consequently,
the
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

failing to instruct the jury accordingly.

This Court should

remand the case for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
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